The social and political construction of public policy problems by Hoppe, Robert
73 
 
 
 
 
 
Hoppe Robert. The social and political construction of public policy problems 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ЗАРУБЕЖНЫЙ ОПЫТ УПРАВЛЕНИЯ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONSTRUCTION 
OF PUBLIC POLICY PROBLEMS1 
 
Robert Hoppe 
 
 
Department of Science, Technology and Policy Studies 
School of Management and Governance 
University of Twente 
7500 AE Enschede, The Netherlands 
 
 
 
Problems as social constructions and claims 
 
 
Let us start from a simple and common sense definition of the concept of 
a „problem‟: One has a problem when one experiences a gap or disparity between 
a moral standard and an image of a present or future state of the world. Someone 
who claims to be plagued by a problem, implicitly or explicitly passes a moral 
judgment. One uses a standard involving value or worthlessness, desirability or 
undesirability, to pass judgment on present or expected acts or situations (e.g. Ro- 
keach, 1973; Frankena, 1973). Some call moral standards strictly phenomenologi- 
cal, subjective facts of our inner, personal lives (Hodgkinson, 1983:31–32). Life 
presents itself to us as a series of moments-facts-events. To these phenomena we 
attribute value; it is what we appreciate. Values are, to put it inelegantly but un- 
ambiguously, „in ourselves‟, not „in things out there‟. People attribute or ascribe 
value to things. In principle, this is a voluntary act. 
However, in political or administrative practice value attribution is part of so- 
cial conventions, social status, bringing up and educational background, political 
ideology, group interest, and, ultimately, expressions of political influence and 
power (Safranski, 1999)
2
. Values are confronted not just as inner feelings with a 
 
 
1 
This article is taken from R. Hoppe, 2011, pp. 66–76. 
2 
Safranski (1999) writes, “Behind every value attribution hides the will to power." This is equally 
true for the „highest values‟: God, the ideas, the metaphysical. … However, even the will to power 
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strictly private character. They are confronted as externally imposed constraints, 
limits, or claims. For example, a public health officer involved in preventing HIV- 
AIDS is drawn into difficult political and ethical dilemmas: 
Attempts to curtail epidemics raise – in the guise of public health – the most 
enduring political dilemma: how to reconcile the individual‟s claim to autonomy 
and liberty with the community‟s concern with safety? How does the polity treat 
the patient who is both citizen and disease carrier? How are individual rights and 
the public good pursued simultaneously? (Baldwin, 2005: 3) 
In this political dilemma, where moral claims for both sides can be traced to 
constitutional clauses and public law, policy actors confront the ethical as objecti- 
fied social constructions, as group claims, and as political power. 
Presented as numbers and tables in statistical reports and government docu- 
ments written by scientists or officials, problems and problem descriptions some- 
times take on the garb of objective, merely factual statements about a situation. 
However, especially public problems are always claims of groups of persons about 
the way they experience a situation: 
…having a problem is a claim on others, on how they ought to think about 
our situation and how they ought to act. …I, as an outside advisor, may claim that 
a society or an organization has a problem. …But the problem is posed by me, 
and unless others feel it or can be made to feel it, it will not be a problem for 
them. They may concur in my definition or choose another one. But my saying 
that a society has a problem…is an act that limits the set of possibilities that can 
be designated by the members of the society. I have attempted to take over the 
problem-defining process, and the society‟s politics (Krieger, 1981:39–43). 
This makes any attempt to frame public problems essentially contested, and 
thus part of the political process and political conflict – as Schattschneider taught 
us so convincingly. What he (and many other political scientists interested in agen- 
da setting) overlooked in his account of problem finding and framing, is that un- 
derstanding the situation and coming to agreement about it necessarily changes 
our understandings – sometimes the understanding of ourselves. Not as political 
manipulation in the strategy and tactics of politics, but as an unavoidable part of 
the process of coming to agreement on the nature of a public issue or problem. 
In forging agreement on public problems, politicians create stories of a group‟s 
problem that help them and others, who originally do not belong to that group, to 
structure their experiences. He concocts from the stories of problematic situations 
experienced by some, a more overarching, more collective story, capable of mobi- 
lizing more people behind a problem formulation. In doing so, the story about the 
problem changes from the purely local, in some way contingent story of some 
 
 
 
has misunderstood itself for a long time. People believed to discover independent essences, while, 
in fact, they invented them out of the force of the will to power… They have denied their own 
value-creating energy…Obviously, they would rather be victim and receiver than author and giver, 
perhaps out of fear for their own freedom.” [translation by RH]. 
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group of people, to a more „cosmopolitan‟ or at least more decontextualized, and 
in that sense more „rational‟ account for a majority. 
Transformation of original problem experiences of a particular  group of 
claimants into a more overarching, collective problem formulation for a political 
majority, then, is more then clever political manipulation. It is inherent in coming 
to some agreed version of the problematic situation in a democratic way. Some 
alienation or distance between individual citizens‟ or a particular group‟s problem 
experience and a politically viable and acceptable problem framing is an unavoid- 
able socio-cognitive fact of democratic life. It is not necessarily, as many political 
scientists have claimed, self- or group interest-driven „bias‟. In principle, this cog- 
nitive dimension is independent from processes of political representation and ag- 
gregation. The transformation of a problem formulation, and the subsequent dis- 
tance or potential alienation felt by some of the original problem-owners, would 
also occur under the most participatory and deliberative forms of politics and col- 
lective decision-making. 
Let us now shift from the normative to the factual or empirical aspect in 
problematization. The fact-value distinction is still frequently justified by invo- 
king the idea that the world of „values‟ is created by our own fiat, whereas the 
world of „facts‟ is an indubitable, external given (e.g. Hodgkinson, 1978:104). But 
epistemologists meanwhile agree that the idea of immediately „given‟ sense data 
as rock-bottom baseline for human knowledge is a misconception. Every form of 
human observation and every „fact‟ discovered through observation, is inevitably 
coloured or pre-structured by frequently implicit, hidden theoretical notions (Die- 
sing, 1991; Ziman, 2000). Thus, in an indelible way events and situations that we 
„see‟ and „experience‟ are influenced by concepts and mind frames acquired in 
the course of our life. In the political, administrative and policy sciences such in- 
sights have generated a flood of research into the ontological, causal and finalistic 
(means-goals) assumptions in policy paradigms, heuristics, mind frames, cogni- 
tive maps, cultural scripts, and the like (Hoppe, 1999; Fischer, 2003). 
Although we should relativize the fact-value distinction from an epistemo- 
logical point of view, we cannot do away with it in practice. When we justify our 
values, we do appeal to the consent of others in terms of arguments of „goodness‟ 
or „justice‟ or „utility‟. When we make claims about facts, we appeal to the consent 
of others in terms of „truth‟, „verisimilitude‟, and „honesty‟. On top of that, 
in spite of many differences, there exists a fair amount of agreement on the ration- 
ality of procedures and methods for  convincing an academic or professional 
community of experts on the truth-value of individual propositions and theories. 
Similar methods or procedures for arguing the superiority of ethical claims or 
theories, like in ethics, theology, and law, are more contested (Fischer, 1980; 
Dunn, 1983). 
More importantly, however suspect the fact-value distinction has become 
from an epistemological point of view, it is historically entrenched in many insti- 
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tutions of modernity. Particularly, the boundaries between the institutions of sci- 
ence and politics, and between politics and administration, have exactly the fact- 
value distinction as one of their pillars. In the practical boundary work between 
representatives of these institutional spheres, the fact-value distinction in continu- 
ously appealed to as a basis for demarcation and coordination of activities (Jasan- 
off, 1990; Halffman, 2003). E.g., people working for independent think tanks and 
policy analysts working in state bureaucracies both refer to science as being ex- 
perimental, empirical, independent, certified, measured, reliable, consistent, care- 
ful, meticulous, peer-reviewed, published, factual, etcetera; whereas politics and 
policy are labelled as a matter of values, decisions, implementation of political 
decisions, choice, wisdom, practical knowledge, managerial, et cetera. 
Ezrahi (1990) has convincingly argued that methods of „objective‟ science 
were complementary to – and actually strengthened – the depersonalized authority 
of democratically elected political leaders and bureaucratically organized civil ser- 
vants. In other words, the fact-value distinction may be epistemologically suspect 
and contested, in political, administrative and scientific practice the boundary line 
is continuously constructed on the basis of the fact-value organization of activi- 
ties, tasks, projects, policy programs, and the like. This does not mean that the 
boundary is clear, pre-given, and conflict free. On the contrary, boundary work 
entails almost day-to-day negotiations between representatives of the different in- 
stitutional spheres to draw the line situationally and contingently (Halffman, 2003). 
The point is that, in doing so, policy relevant actors appeal to fact-value laden in- 
stitutional narratives. „Bureaucracy‟ is shorthand for the front-office narrative that 
bureaucrats serve and obey democratically accountable politicians, and everything 
entailed in the division of labor between instrumental and substantive rationality 
in day-to-day policy work. „Decisionism‟ conveys a similar narrative that truth- 
telling science bows to the primacy of value-proclaiming politics. Put more pre- 
cisely, in the back-office negotiations and consultative mutual cooperation of their 
day-to-day boundary work, civil servants and experts act „in the shadow‟ of insti- 
tutional rules of bureaucracy and decisionism (Hoppe & Huijs, 2003). 
This is exactly the reason why, as a first step in following Steinberger‟s sug- 
gestions (1980), the fact-value distinction provides the analyst with two socially 
and politically grounded dimensions for a typology of policy problems. Every ef- 
fort to pin down a problem is a double social construct. And this is not all. In 
problem framing and definition, fact-constructions are linked to norm-construc- 
tions through comparison; and this comparison also is a social construction in it- 
self. Here too, the comparison, in political or administrative practice, is not just an 
individual act of free will. Politicians, administrators, policy and science advisers 
cannot just arbitrarily compare values and facts and on that basis attribute the 
label „problem‟ to the judgment that the facts of a situation do not meet some 
standard. In order to successfully do this, they have to take into account the distri- 
bution of agreement and disagreement and power relations in different forums 
(cf. Watzlawick et al, 1974): 
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a. degree of consent on (prognosticated) facts in all kinds of political, admini- 
strative and scientific or professional forums, the media and public opinion; 
b. degree of consent on values at stake; 
c. degree of consent on the problem formulation itself, i.e. the comparison of 
fact- and value-sets. 
For example, in Amsterdam city government during the latter half of the 
1980s, the norm of equal treatment irrespective of gender, and facts about prefe- 
rential treatment for women, were linked as a goal to a means. In the political cli- 
mate of those days, there was strong agreement on the factual need and normative 
desirability of this instrumental link. Whoever would politically criticize this con- 
struction between a value and a fact as in reality ineffective, or as an unjustified 
gap between the practice of a policy program and an ethical standard of non- 
discrimination, would not only fight a lost political cause; even the courts would 
rule against him. 
In summary, the elegant simplicity of the concept of „problem‟ as a gap be- 
tween a moral or ethical standard and some existing or expected situation cannot 
conceal its deeply problematic structure. Anyone formulating a problem constructs 
an easily contestable connection between ontologically disparate elements: moral 
standards or ethical guidelines (norms, values, principles, ideals), on the one hand, 
and facts, „data‟ or empirical elements, on the other. Straddling the fact-value dis- 
tinction, the concept of a „problem‟ expresses the inextricable entwining of fact- 
values or value-facts in politics and administrative practice (Forester, 1989:240– 
241). Exacerbating the epistemological hybridity of the concept, one should add 
the second property of public policy problems: they are social constructs in every 
respect. Thus, when a politician or policymaker, on behalf of some authoritative 
political institution or public agency, formulates a problem, and this formulation 
gets accepted by a majority, a very complex and delicate social „composition‟ has 
been created. It is both complex and delicate because as a political and social fab- 
ric it may be torn apart in three ways: 
a. the social construction of the facts may be denied, or judged to be incom- 
plete, biased, misleading, or even a set of outright lies, and so forth; 
b. the social construction of values may be judged as incomplete, one-sided, 
wrong or unjust in principle, and so on; 
c. the comparative link between facts and values may be rejected as illogical, 
irrelevant, not plausible, nonsensical, etcetera. 
At the same time, having contributed to the bringing about of such a delicate 
fabric as a politically accepted problem definition, why should one be modest 
about one‟s achievement? And why not resist any effort at deconstruction and re- 
framing as wrong-headed, even malicious? After all, the universal and rational 
notion of processing problem claims that problem-solving efforts require stable 
problem definitions lest they become „moving targets‟. 
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Four types of policy problems 
 
 
The simple definition of a „problem‟ hides a complex social construction. 
In this section, the heuristically productive and theoretically plausible reduction 
of that complexity for purposes of political judgment, policy analysis and policy 
design is at stake. It means that one should be able to distinguish between types of 
problems in the public sector. What is needed is a typology of policy problems, as 
a kind of model of the task environments that politicians and other policymakers 
face in the analysis, design, and evaluation of public policies. But first we need 
some minimal assumptions about the problem processing behaviour of politicians 
and proximate policymakers (cf. Forester, 1989). 
Like all human beings, politicians and proximate policymakers are cognitive 
misers – perhaps even more so than other people, due to the information overload 
of the hyper-complex social-institutional contexts in which they usually operate. 
In their task environments they have good reasons to want maximum intellectual 
results from minimal cognitive efforts. For them processing problem claims in a 
more or less rational way involves three distinct, but connected demands (cf. Gig- 
erenzer et al, 1999): 
1. Bounded rationality (Simon, 1947; Simon, 1957): dealing with problems – 
from experiencing a problematic situation, to problem framing and defining, all 
the way to applying search and stop rules for alternative creation and selection, or 
problem solving – is intendedly, but boundedly rational. As information proces- 
sing system, the human brain runs into cognitive limits determined by our neuro- 
physiologic make-up, like the processing capacity of short- and long-term me- 
mory. The human capacity for information processing is less than fully adapted to 
the complexity of our environment. Dealing rationally with problems should make 
realistic demands on time, speed and computational skills of ordinary men. The 
implication is that human beings, politicians and policymakers among them, 
unavoidably use strategies and heuristics of complexity reduction. Practically, 
it means that that there will always be a tension between analysis and intuition; 
analysis as a “step-by-step, conscious, logically defensible (cognitive) process”, 
and more intuitive ways of problem coping that somehow produce a solution, but 
through unarticulated, tacit ways, without the transparency and consistency of 
more analytic methods (Hammond, 1996:60ff.) 
2. Ecological rationality (Hammond, 1996:111ff.; Goldstein & Hogarth, 1997): 
rational problem processing always is a performance in a real-world environment 
or task environment. From an evolutionary point of view the human capacity to 
survive and adapt to changing environments implies that rationality works suc- 
cessfully only through some kind of correspondence between the inner and outer 
life world. Like many other animals, humans use multiple fallible indicators to 
judge this correspondence between problem processing efforts and task environ- 
ment. Monitoring policy fields by elaborate sets of economic, social, cultural and 
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ecological indicators, of course, is a well-known device for policymakers (e.g., 
MacRae, 1985; MacRae and Whittington, 1997). Practically, ecological rationality 
introduces a tension between generality and specificity, the cosmopolitan and the 
local, situational, or contextual elements in problem processing. 
3. Social rationality (Janis & Mann, 1977; Tetlock, 1997): this is a special 
form of ecological rationality, as persons making claims on other persons (see 
above) socially construct most of a human problem-processing context. Psycholo- 
gist Philip E. Tetlock (1997:660–661) gives an excellent description of the so- 
cially constructed task environment of political and public life in his two core as- 
sumptions on humans as „would-be‟ politicians: (a) “accountability of conduct as 
a universal feature of the natural decision environment”; as the most important 
link between individual policymakers and the social-political environments in 
which they typically act; and (b) people act as approval-and-status seekers, keen 
on protecting and enhancing their self-esteem, social image and identity, while 
acquiring power and wealth. Practically, these assumptions give rise to two inter- 
dependent tensions. First, a tension between a correspondence theory of truth, 
based on criteria of accuracy in representing a „real life‟ world; and coherence 
theories of truth based on criteria of logical and attitudinal consistency with prior 
beliefs and positions (Hammond, 1996). Second, a tension between judgments 
arrived at through one‟s personal feelings, intuitions, observations and analyses; 
and judgments generated by social pressures or instigation by others-as-group- 
members (Hoppe, 1983). The de-ideologization and individualization processes in 
coming to political judgment clearly exacerbate both. Individualization of political 
judgment erodes trust of socially instigated judgments; de-ideologization attrib- 
utes a less prominent place to a coherence theory of political truth, and boosts 
a correspondence theory of political truth. The rising number of performance indi- 
cators and league tables in policymaking evidences the trend. 
Acting boundedly, ecologically, and socially rational, policy actors will be 
prone to use an acceptability heuristic (Tetlock, 1997; confirming Braybrooke & 
Lindblom, 1963): in accounting for their decisions they will first and foremost 
look at acceptability in the eyes of those who have to support, represent, or other- 
wise publicly cover them. Projecting this on the dimensions of accountability for 
the framing and definition of public problems, policymakers and politicians con- 
front different potential situations. 
Regarding moral or ethical standards, they will distinguish between policy 
problems whose standards, norms, values and objectives are more or less agreed 
to. Similarly, concerning perceptions of present and future situations or condi- 
tions, and the deliberate transformation of problematic present into improved fu- 
ture, they will distinguish between policy problems in which there is more or less 
certainty on available and usable knowledge. Using these two dimensions – de- 
gree of agreement on normative claims at stake, degree of certainty on relevant 
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and available knowledge – one may construct the following typology of the socio- 
cognitive status of problems for policymakers in political task environments
3
: 
The heart of the typology is the opposed pair of structured versus unstruc- 
tured problems. One can speak of structured problems, when policy designers 
perceive unanimity or near consensus on the normative issues at stake, and are 
very certain about the validity and applicability of claims to relevant knowledge. 
They simply know how to turn a problematic present situation into the improved, 
or desirable, unproblematic future situation. A structured problem is like a puzzle. 
However complex, the pieces of the puzzle are given, and for each puzzle there is 
just one configuration of pieces representing an adequate solution (Mason & Mi- 
troff, 1981; Dery, 1984). There exists a solution for the problem that, for all prac- 
tical purposes, is complete and fully guaranteed; usually by means of standardized 
methods of applied science or professional practice. Rittel & Webber (1973) give 
as examples „domesticated‟ problems of low complexity from the early days of 
statehood, like building and paving roads, designing and building housing (but see 
Simon, 1973), eradicating dread diseases (but see Baldwin, 2005), and providing 
clean water and sanitary sewers. Many, not all
4 
problems of a medical nature fall 
into this category. Scientific, technical, evidence-based treatment and therapy 
makes for high levels of certainty on relevant knowledge. Also, there appears to 
be near unanimous consent on the goals of medicine: prevention of disease and 
injury, promotion and maintenance of good health, relief of pain and suffering 
caused by maladies, care and cure of the sick, care for those who cannot be cured, 
and avoidance of premature death and pursuit of peaceful death (Callahan, 
2003:88–92). It is because of these two properties that the problem definition of 
structured problems can be kept out of the sphere of subjectivity, politics and 
overt interest struggle (De Jouvenel, 1963:206–207). Structured problems, thus, 
usually are matters of administrative implementation and professional routine. 
One may speak of unstructured problems when policymakers observe wide- 
spread discomfort with the status quo, yet perceive persistent high uncertainty 
about relevant knowledge claims, and high preference volatility in mass and elite 
opinion, or strong, divisive, even community-threatening conflict over the values 
at stake. Rittel & Webber call such unstructured problems „wicked‟5, because any 
 
3 
I do not claim any originality here. To my knowledge, the typology was first constructed and 
used by Thompson & Tuden (1959) in order to link decision styles to organizational structures. 
It has been used later by numerous authors in many different fields: business management (Nutt, 
1989), policy studies (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1983; Dryzek and Ripley, 1988), science, techno- 
logy and society studies (Ezrahi, 1980), organization studies and organizational learning (Crossan, 
Lane, Hildebrand, 1993; Stacey, 1996; Choo, 1998), and this list is far from exhaustive. Of course, 
the multiple uses by numerous authors strengthen my judgment that the typology is valid across 
many fields of application. 
4 
Consult Callahan, 2003 and Hoppe, 2008 for the presence of not-so-structured problems in medi- 
cine and health care. 
5 
The „wickedness‟ of unstructured problems, of course, is the opposite of „domestication‟ in struc- 
tured problems. Note how the use of the concept of „wicked problems‟ in the governmental reform 
literature completely misses the political and cognitive aspects of unstructured problems by defi- 
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solution effort immediately spawns new dissent and more intense conflict. Un- 
structured problems are difficult to disentangle „webs‟ of interrelated problems; 
they resist decomposition in (quasi)independent clusters of problems. There is 
dissent and conflict over which pieces belong to the „puzzle‟, and over which ar- 
rangement of the pieces means „solving‟ the puzzle. In the risk societies of late 
modernity where the distribution of risks has succeeded the welfare state‟s distri- 
bution of goods as focus of public debate (Beck, 1992) the volume and intensity 
of unstructured problems appears to be on the rise. Sometimes the negative side 
effects of entrenched technologies cause a U-turn from structured to unstructured 
problem. Issues like the car mobility problem (Hendriks, 1999; Hoppe & Grin, 
2000), the building of nuclear power plants in the Netherlands in the 1980‟s 
(Hisschemöller,1993: 71–78), contemporary planning for a nuclear phase-out in 
Belgium (Laes et al, 2004), and anthropogenic global warming (Peterse, 2006) 
belong in this category. Sometimes it is the unbridled research and innovation 
drive, which leads to new, unstructured problems. This may manifest itself in new 
medical technologies like (therapeutic) cloning and xenotransplantation or break- 
throughs in preventive screening by genomics (Callahan, 2003; Hoppe, 2008). 
Contrary to structured problems, unstructured problems occasionally are in the 
political spotlight, and may even generate sustained, intractable political contro- 
versies (Schön and Rein, 1994). 
Moderately structured problems (ends) occur when policymakers observe a 
great deal of agreement on the norms, principles, ends and goals of defining a de- 
sirable future state; but simultaneously considerable levels of uncertainty about 
the relevance and/or reliability of knowledge claims about how to bring it about. 
This kind of problem typically leads to disputes of what kind of research might 
deliver more certain knowledge for solving the problem. Given uncertain knowl- 
edge, and thus uncertain effectiveness and efficiency of interventions, moderately 
structured problems (ends) also frequently raise issues of bargaining about who 
will be responsible for expenditures in financing or otherwise enabling certain in- 
terventions; and for risks in case of ineffectiveness or negative side effects. Issues 
like traffic safety (Hoppe and Grin, 2000), ambient particulate matter (Peterse, 
2006), fighting obesitas (VWS/ Department of Public Health, 2009) and many is- 
sues of policies for routinely agreed-upon socio-economic goals like maximizing 
gross domestic product and minimizing inflation (Halffman & Hoppe, 2005) be- 
long to this problem type. 
 
ning them as problems “that cross departmental boundaries and resist the solutions that are readily 
available through the action of one agency” (representative example in Perri 6 et al., 2003:34). 
Focussing on the technical, administrative and organizational aspects of service delivery for parti- 
cular problems turns almost any problem into a „wicked‟ one. Putting a man on the moon, for in- 
stance would be an extremely „wicked‟ problem; so would be offshore oil drilling for energy sa- 
fety. Yet, we know these are structured, quite „doable‟ problems, albeit managerially and techni- 
cally very complex ones. In the original meaning of the word, it is the inextricable mix of (cog- 
nitive) puzzlement and political conflict that makes tackling certain problems unstructured or 
„wicked‟. 
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Moderately structured problems (means) exist when relevant and required 
knowledge tends to high levels of certainty, but there is ongoing dissent on the 
normative claims at stake. The key characteristic of this type of policy problem is 
not knowledge certainty, but the valuative ambiguity, and frequently the contested 
and divisive nature of the ethics of the problem. The Dutch debate on abortion 
provides an excellent example. When the issue arrived at the political agenda, 
a new, fully safe abortion technique had been introduced. The early debate focus- 
sed on the in- principle moral permissibility of abortion; later phases concentrated 
on the conditions under which abortion might be permissible; and on alternative 
procedures of consultation for establishing such conditions (Oudshoorn, 1986). 
In American political and policy studies the concept of „morality policy‟ (Mo- 
oney, 1999; Smith, 2002) or even „sin policy‟ (Meier, 1999) has been coined to 
cover a cluster of moderately structured (means) problems that are generally high 
on the conservative political agenda, and characterized by an emphasis on funda- 
mental notions of right and wrong, high political salience, and low information 
costs. Abortion, euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide, racism and anti-discri- 
mination policies in general, same-sex marriage, capital punishment, gun control, 
smoking, family and (criminal) youth policy all would belong to this class of prob- 
lem constructions. 
In spite of the illustrations given for clarity‟s sake, the four problem types are 
ideal types in the Weberian sense: simplifying and focusing, and therefore to some 
extent screening out some problem properties in order to bring other aspects 
(in this case, cognitive and design facets in a political task environment) into 
sharper relief. For one thing, the typology‟s dimensions are not inherently dicho- 
tomous; consequently, not every policy problem will be unambiguously classifi- 
able as one of the four types. In real-life cases one encounters hybrid pairings (see 
Hoppe, 2011). For another, it will frequently be the case that different policy 
actors will classify the „same‟ problematic situation differently; and even for 
the same policy actor problem types are stable only for certain periods of time. 
However, it is quite possible to deal with these familiar analytic problems of mul- 
tiple policy actors and the temporality and transformation of problem frames. 
Here only the heuristic value of the typology is claimed for the analysis of politi- 
cally authoritative policy design – be it from a formally political, bureaucratic or 
scientific position. Given the assumptions about the bounded, ecological and so- 
cial rationality of politicians and policymakers, we cannot expect them to define 
problems „objectively‟. Policy problems are by definition socio-political constructs 
and presuppose political (inter)subjectivity. However, this subjectivity does not 
operate randomly. People may display certain judgmental and behavioral patterns 
in defining problems. (see Hoppe 2007; and Hoppe, 2011, 121–144). 
From the basic assumptions the expectation is derived that governmental 
policymakers and decision-makers prefer to define „their‟ problems as structured. 
Rendering issues technical, or depoliticization is a standard strategy; sometimes 
extremely successful. Kaiser and Schot (2014) have convincingly shown how by 
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doing so the European Union, since its beginnings in the 1950s, and in spite of its 
apparent democratic deficit, became a most successful technocratic project. Ex- 
tending Scott‟s Seeing Like A State (1999), Li (2006) shows how the World Bank, 
in spite of a complete lack of democratic legitimacy, can implement far-reaching 
social development programs in Indonesia and many other countries in South-East 
Asia through claims of epistemic authority in „rendering things technical‟. Rende- 
ring policy problems technical minimizes politicians‟ uncertainty, limits the need 
for search activities, and constrains the range of alternative solutions to existing 
repertoires. Essentially, it allows them to delegate or „outsource‟ dealing with po- 
licy problems to epistemic communities of experts and technicians. Furthermore, 
it is hypothesized that when there is too much complexity or social conflict, they 
will continue trying to minimize „trouble‟. Therefore, they will prefer to identify 
these politically more sensitive situations as one of the two classes of moderately 
structured problems. They would rather not admit to themselves and others that 
they have fully unstructured problems on their hands. This implies that govern- 
mental policymakers will show a marked tendency to ignore, sometimes actively 
screen out, information that may complicate the policy problem under scrutiny. 
This tendency need not be deliberate, or even acknowledged. Policymakers may 
be completely unaware of their screening relevant information away from the po- 
licy arena since they may not consciously grasp the biases that are inherent in their 
own belief systems and policy frames. 
Another reason for problem framing bias or sheer neglect is that policymakers 
when finding and choosing a problem frame immediately find themselves bound 
by a „legitimate‟ problem space and a political discourse to discuss it. That is, they 
determine what can, cannot, may, and may not be said about the problem without 
being labelled as transgressing politically „correct‟ boundaries or rules of the po- 
litical language game. In respecting rules of political correctness, they implicitly 
decide on which values are at stake and pre-structure which (type of) knowledge 
is relevant and required for problem solving. In the case of gaps between problem 
understanding by official policymakers and other influential proximate policy- 
makers and stakeholders or the public at large they run the risk of tackling what is 
called the „wrong problem‟. They may treat as „structured‟ a problem that other 
stakeholders – be they peak associations, pressure groups, target populations, 
or even their own executive managers and street-level bureaucrats – experience 
and define as much more complex and controversial than they are willing to 
admit. It is exactly at this point where, if they go unacknowledged, unattended to, 
or denied for too long, intractable policy struggles occur. 
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